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INTRODUCTION
On March 24, 1999, United States and NATO warplanes appeared
in the skies over Yugoslavia on the first night of what would become a 78Their mission was to systematically attack
day bombing campaign.
Yugoslav air defenses, ground troops, and infrastructure in order to drive
the Yugoslav army and police forces out of Kosovo. Over the ensuing three
months, NATO airpower gradually forced Yugoslavia to accept Western
terms for a cease-fire' and allow the repatriation of hundreds of thousands
of ethnic Albanians. 2 NATO launched the air strikes with the stated goal of
"the unconditional and safe return of refugees... [and] unhindered access
In addition, NATO4
for the humanitarian relief organisations . . . .
forces
demanded an immediate and verifiable end to operations by Serb

1 See Rebecca Grant, Airpower Made it Work, AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, Nov. 1999, at 30,
37 (arguing that "the 78-day air campaign brought about an ending that seemed almost
impossible back in March."); but see Tim Butcher & Patrick Bishop, NATO: Bombs not
Decisive, CHI. SuN-TIMEs, July 22, 1999, at 25, John Barry & Evan Thomas, The Kosovo
Cover-up, NEWSWEEK, May 15, 2000, at 23 (arguing that bomb damage was grossly
overestimated and actually had little impact on the Yugoslav military).
2 See Tani Freedman, UNHCR to Accompany FirstNATO Group into Kosovo, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, June 10, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library.
3 Jamie Shea, NATO Press Conference, M2 Presswire, Apr. 15, 1999, available in
LEXIS, News Group File.
4 See id.
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and the presence in Kosovo of an international military force that could
oversee the return of peace to the region.5
The war in Kosovo is significant historically as the first (and quite
possibly the last) military operation ever conducted by NATO against a
sovereign state.6 Of much greater significance is the fact that the war in
Kosovo may signify a turning point in the international law of armed
conflict. If proponents of the legal doctrine of "humanitarian intervention"
have their way, Kosovo will stand as a concrete example of a legitimate use
of force for humanitarian ends.7 Critics of humanitarian intervention argue
that the use of force against a sovereign state violates the most imperative
international legal norms, not to mention the Charter of the United Nations.
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan aptly summarized the fundamental
dilemma facing parties on either side of the debate: "On the one hand, is it
legitimate for a regional organisation to use force without a UN mandate?
On the other, is it permissible to let gross and systematic violations of
human rights, with grave humanitarian consequences, continue
unchecked?"8
There is law to support the doctrine of intervention, but it is unclear
exactly what a proper intervention entails, and how the Kosovo operation
fits into, or modifies, the legal doctrine. This Note attempts to establish
criteria for legal humanitarian intervention and evaluate Kosovo according
to those criteria. Section II sets forth the traditional justification for
humanitarian intervention, identifies the main criticisms of it, and then
explains why a doctrine of intervention remains today. Section III then
attempts to identify the components of that doctrine and develop a
framework that can be used to evaluate the legality of future interventions.
Section IV evaluates the Kosovo intervention using that framework to
determine how well it meets the legal requirements of humanitarian
intervention. In conclusion, this Note examines the impact of Kosovo on
other conflicts and determines its role in the development of international
law.
'

See id.

6

See Bill Hayton, Today Kosovo, Tomorrow the World, NEw STATESMAN, Apr. 2, 1999,

at 11.
7 For purposes of this Note, humanitarian intervention will be defined as "the unilateral
intervention for protection of another state's nationals from human rights violations."
Nikolai Krylov, HumanitarianIntervention: Pros and Cons, 17 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
L.L 365, 366 (1995) (citing Ulrich Beyerlin, HumanitarianIntervention, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA
PUB. INr'L L. 211, 212 (1981)). While intervention is often held to include non-military
methods of coercion, our discussion will focus only on the use of military force for
humanitarian ends. See infra note 20.
8 Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1999, at 49. See
also Law and Right: When They Don't Fit Together, ECONOMST, Apr. 3, 1999, at 19
(outlining the legal bases for humanitarian intervention).
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I. LEGAL BACKGROUND: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Despite the general prohibition on the use of force in the post
WWII era, a legal doctrine of humanitarian intervention survives, embodied
in the custom and practice of state actors in the international arena.9 The
United Nations was formed to accomplish two principle goals: 1) to prevent
the use of force as a means of settling disputes; and 2) to protect universal
human rights.10 Those two goals often conflict when force is used to
enforce human rights standards. 1 A strict interpretation of the UN Charter
leads to the conclusion that the prohibition on force is absolute, 12 with two
narrowly defined exceptions: 1) self-defense; 13 and 2) collective action by
the UN. 14 However, the UN Charter also requires its members to actively
enforce human rights standards. 15 The resulting dilemma imposes upon
states a duty to refrain from the use of force, and at the same time a duty to
enforce human rights standards. Faced with this impasse, some states have
opted to use force as a means of last resort to prevent humanitarian tragedy,
while at the same time seeking to establish a self-defense argument in order
to avoid UN sanction. 16 As the next section will show, this type of legal
gamesmanship is not necessary, as a well-circumscribed legal right to
intervene exists.

9 See generally David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modem Doctrine of Humanitarian
Intervention, 23 U. TOL. L. Rev. 253 (1992) (providing a comprehensive examination of the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention). David Scheffer was Ambassador for War Crimes in
the Clinton State Department, and has been a vocal advocate of humanitarian intervention in
Kosovo. See Lawyer Sam's War, ECONOMIST, Apr. 24, 1999, at 30.
10 See Steve G. Simon, The Contemporary Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian
Intervention, 24 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 117, 124 (1993).
" Id. at 124-25 ("[T]he U.N. system creates a paradox. If one nation allows [another] to
human rights .. ., the first nation has violated article 55 by failing to promote
human rights whereas if the first nation intervenes, she has violated article 2(4)..
violate...

12 See id. at 126.
13 See U.N. CHARTER art. 51, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 18

(Ian Brownlie ed., 3d ed. 1983).
14 See id. at ch. VII.

See id. art. 55, at 18.
16 For example, India justified its intervention into East Pakistan as self-defense, despite
the obvious humanitarian impulse behind India's action. See infra note 66.
'5
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A. Moral Rationalefor Intervention
Before

considering

whether international

law

recognizes

humanitarian intervention, it is important to understand the moral
justification for using force to prevent humanitarian tragedy. The moral
argument for the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is compelling. As
one writer puts it, "[t]he right of people not to be killed should not depend

on whether the state of which they are citizens is in a position to protect
them, wants to protect them, or is itself the source of the danger."'17 In other
words, human rights are so valuable that even the sanctity of "sovereignty"
should not serve as a bar to their protection. Ideally, in the post-Cold War
world, any military intervention in defense of human rights would be led by

the United Nations, which has legal authority to conduct peacekeeping
operations. 18 However, as the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrated,"

the United Nations is not immune to the impediments of international
geopolitics. Often the competing• interests
•
20 of rival states make a Security
Council action impractical or impossible. Under these circumstances, it
may be necessary for a state or organization to unilaterally intervene with

military force to prevent a massive loss of human life.2 '

Critics of humanitarian intervention raise valid questions over the

morality of using force to "prevent" loss of life. Use of force necessarily
involves taking life, both as the direct result of combat, and as the indirect
result of the destruction of roads, shelter, water supplies, and other basic
necessities.2 2 Even assuming that using force would result in less harm than
17 Malvina Halberstam, The Legality of HumanitarianIntervention, 3 CARDOZO J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 1, 2 (1995).
18 See generally U.N. CHARTER ch. VII, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 13 (laying the legal foundation for U.N. action in response
to acts of aggression).
19For a firsthand account of the failure of the United Nations to solve the Bosnia crisis, and
the ensuing NATO-sponsored peace accord, see RICHARD HOLBROOKE, To END A WAR
(1999).
20 See Halberstam, supra note 17, at 6. Halberstam writes, "We should be wary,
however, of limiting humanitarian intervention to collective action authorized by the
Security Council. The legality of humanitarian intervention should not be subject to the veto
power of any one state." Id.
21 Some scholars insist that the definition of "humanitarian intervention" should be
broadened to include non-military interventions by humanitarian relief organizations, as well
as economic sanctions and other forms of non-military coercion. See Scheffer, supra note 9,
at 266. However, this Note will focus exclusively on military intervention.
22 This argument was often raised in the debate over Kosovo. Senators and journalists
alike questioned the morality of bombing one group of people to save another. However,
most of the opposition to the Kosovo mission within the US centered around the wisdom of
exposing U.S. troops to danger. See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, Senators Clash over U.S. Role in a
NATO Bombing Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1999, at All.
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would result from standing aside and waiting for the effect of sanctions or
diplomacy, there is something fundamentally problematic about arguing for
the just war. However, when the choice is between using force for the
greater good or inaction in the face of genocide, torture, or "ethnic
cleansing," the morality of humanitarian intervention is in many ways
unquestionable.23 It is imperative to establish a strong legal precedent for
humanitarian intervention in order to deter future human rights violations.
More importantly, critics argue, is that the very idea of intervention
runs contrary to the concept of national sovereignty. International law is
predicated on the idea that each state is sovereign and free to act as it sees
fit within its own borders. 24 When this principle is undermined, the result is
chaos in international affairs and the steady rise of the dominance of strong
nations over weak.
However, it may be that our conception of sovereignty is
fundamentally flawed. Rather than viewing the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention as curtailing or interfering with sovereignty, we should see it as
action in a sphere where state sovereignty itself is limited - the sphere of
basic human rights. Because "the ultimate justification of the existence of
states is the protection and enforcement of the natural rights of the citizens,
a government that engages in substantial violations of human rights betrays
the very purpose for which it exists and so forfeits not only its domestic
legitimacy, but its international legitimacy as well."5 Thus, sovereignty
can only be justified as long as the basic right to life is preserved. In this
sense, sovereignty is limited. In the post-Cold War world, sovereignty
remains important, 26 but it pales in significance when compared to the basic
This re-definition of
moral imperative to protect human rights.
27
sovereignty allows for the international protection of human rights and
2
thus avoids conflict between sovereignty and humanitarian intervention.
23

See Jordan J. Paust, Peace-Making and Security Council Powers: Bosnia-Herzegovina

Raises International and Constitutional Questions, 19 S. ILL. U.L.J. 131, 132 (1994).
Standing aside may actually compound the problem. Professor Paust notes that "[w]e...
should have learned that an attempted appeasement of those who commit acts of genocide
Id.
might not actually promote peace and stability ....
24 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287 (4h ed. 1990).
Brownlie defines sovereignty as entailing both "a jurisdiction, prima facie exclusive, over a
territory and the permanent population living there.. ." and "a duty of non-intervention in
Id.
the area of exclusive jurisdiction of other states ....

R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND
15-16 (2d ed., 1997).
See Jost Delbrtick, A More Effective International Law or a New "World Law"? -

25 FERNANDO
MORALrrY
26

Some Aspects of the Development of InternationalLaw in a Changing InternationalSystem,
68 IND. L.J. 705, 705-06 (1993) (arguing that sovereignty remains as important as ever, but
is paralleled by a growth in international cooperation and cross-border enforcement of
international legal norms).
27 See Scheffer, supra note 9, at 260. Scheffer argues that:
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In addition, the type of humanitarian crisis that prompts
intervention is very likely itself a threat to state sovereignty. War crimes
and crimes against humanity are crimes of universal jurisdiction precisely
because they have a profound effect on the interests of all states. 29 When
war crimes go unpunished, they cause destabilization in surrounding states
in the form of displaced refugees and the spread of armed conflict,3 which
may lead to a larger war.31 It is thus in the general interest of all states to
the exclusive, national premise of sovereignty no longer prevails. It is
changing because the pieces on the global chess board are changing ....
There are scores of ethnic groups struggling for self-determination;
millions of refugees and displaced people fleeing from war, oppression,
and a host of human tragedies; and hundreds of regional and
international organizations exercising jurisdiction across national
borders. Each one of these can challenge or is actively attempting to
challenge the sovereign power of a national government and claim rights
independently guaranteed under modem international law.
Id. (citations omitted).
28 W.E. Hall, an opponent of creating a legal doctrine, believed that intervention could
only be justified on moral grounds, and that there was no good legal argument. "There is
fair reason... for hoping that intervention... may be useful and even beneficent. Still,
from the point of view of law, it is always to be remembered that states so intervening are
going beyond their legal powers. Their excuse or their justification can only be a moral
one." Louis B. SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 143 (1973) (citing W.E. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 309 (4eh ed.,
London, 1895)).
29 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 cmt. a (explaining that
"[ulniversal jurisdiction over [war crimes] ... is a result of universal condemnation of those
activities and general interest in cooperatingto suppress them.. .") (emphasis added).
30 Gross human rights abuses often create refugees, which act as a major destabilizing
force. See Maria Stavropoulou, The Right Not to Be Displaced, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 689, 689 ("Displacement . . . threatens international peace and security.").
Stavropoulou also cites the 1986 Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on
International Co-operation to Avert New Flows of Refugees, which stated that forced
displacement and the creation of refugees will "(1) create individual human misery (2)
impose political, economic, and social burdens upon the international community and
especially on developing countries (3) affect the domestic order and stability of receiving
states (4) jeopardize the political and social stability and the economic development of the
region and (5) endanger international peace and security." Id. at 707 (citation omitted).
31 The assumption that peace at any price is better than war has been proven wrong time
and again.
It is evident.., that there are dangers posed by a UN effort to maintain
peace and stability at any price. Peace may not serve security in a given
circumstance. Similarly, peace may be seriously threatening to human
rights and self-determination. Indeed, a lasting peace or peace in the
long ran may demand that armed force be used "in the common interest"
to stop atrocities in violation of human rights and self-determination.
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cooperate to prevent and punish war crimes, in order to prevent the
outbreak of war and the resulting economic and political upheaval.
B. Legal Underpinnings:Foundationin Customary Law
The legal doctrine of humanitarian intervention finds scholarly
support as early as the 17th century, when Hugo Grotius wrote that "where
[tyrants] provoke their own people to despair and resistance by unheard of
cruelties, having themselves abandoned all the laws of nature, they lose the
rights of independent sovereigns, and can no longer claim the privilege of
the law of nations. 32
However, international law is not created by scholars in a vacuum the theory must be supported by either treaty, general principles of law
recognized by all states, custom and practice, or (in some cases) judicial
decisions in order to become law.33 Customary law is "the oldest and the
original source of international law, ' 34 and it is the source of the law of
humanitarian intervention. When the International Court of Justice was
established by the United Nations, its founders were careful to determine
exactly what sources of law the international legal system would recognize
as valid. Article 38, §1(b) of the Statute of the I.C.J. includes "international
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law" among the four
sources of international law. From this definition, modem legal scholars
have distilled two major requirements. 35 First, there must be generality of
practice.3 6 This standard has been interpreted as requiring "no more than a
mere handful" 37 of states; nevertheless, there must be some common
practice shared by several states. Second, there must be acceptance of this
practice as law.38 The states that share 39the general practice must do so
based on the belief that the law requires it.

Paust, supra note 23, at 131. "Clearly, the attempted appeasement of Nazi genocidal acts
and aggression did little to forestall a major war and may have assured an ultimate and more
destructive denial of peace." Id. at 132.
32 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 288 (A.C. Campbell trans., photo.
reprint 1993) (1901).
33 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, ch. II, art. 38(1). See also HENRY J.
STEINER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 240 (1994).
34 L OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW

25-26 (8d' ed. 1955), cited in

STEINER Er AL.,

supra note 33, at 232.
35 See Hiram E. Chodosh, Neither Treaty Nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative
InternationalLaw, 26 TEx. INT'LL.J. 87, 102 (1991).
36

See id. at 102-03.

37

Id. at 102.
See id. at 103.

38

39 See id.
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C. Custom and Practicebefore the UN
A general custom and practice of humanitarian intervention existed
as early as the 19th century; 40 even those critical of intervention concede
that the French intervention in Syria in 1860-61 to stop massacres of the
Christian minority was a legitimate humanitarian operation. 4 ' Proponents
of intervention also cite the British, French, and Russian intervention in
Greece (1827-1830),42 the Russian intervention in Turkey (1877-1878), and
the Greek, Bulgarian, and Serb intervention in Macedonia (1903) as
examples of humanitarian interventions that were regarded as legal
operations.43
The Syrian operation is probably the best example of humanitarian
intervention in the pre-Warieriod. Shocked by massacres of Maronite
Christian minorities in Syria, France landed troops and patrolled the coast
of Syria with naval vessels to prevent recurrence of the massacres. While
the Turkish Sultan eventually authorized this intervention by treaty, he did
so under strong compulsion from France, Britain, and Russia.45 France
certainly had other reasons for wanting to influence events in the Middle
46
East, but the primary motive for intervention was to stop wanton killing.

40 See Scheffer, supra note 9, at 258-59.
41 See IAN BROWNLmi,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATEs 340
(1963). For a detailed account of the Syrian intervention, see SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra
note 28, at 143-80.
42 See BROWNLiE, supra note 41, at 339. Brownlie opposes humanitarian intervention,

but concedes in this case that "[tihe substantial motive was the prevention of racial
I"
k.
extermination ....
43 See Scheffer, supra note 9, at 254-55 n.4.
44 One account of these massacres provided by a "contemporary writer" bears reprinting

here because of the striking similarity between it and the Serb atrocities against Albanians in
Kosovo. According to this anonymous author, several hundred Maronites took refuge in a
walled town under the supposed protection of the Turkish governor. "'[Aifter a
conversation between the governor and the Druses,] the gate was thrown open and in rushed
the fiends, cutting down and slaughtering every male, the soldiers co-operating .... I have
good reason to believe, after a careful comparison of all the accounts, that from 1100 to 1200
males actually perished in that one day."' SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 145
(alteration in original) (citing 102 Annual Register, pt. 1, at 251-55 (1860)).
45 See SOHN & BuERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 156 n.1.
46 See R.J. VINCENT, NONINTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 11 (1974). "France
intervened in Syria in 1860 in order to save the Christian Maronite tribes of the Lebanon
from the ravages of the Moslem Druses, an act which has been called one of 'pure humanity'
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D. Treaty Law: the UN Charterand its Prohibitionon the Use
of Force
Some scholars argue that even if a rudimentary custom and practice
of intervention once existed, the formation of the United Nations effectively
repudiated this practice by forbidding military intervention. 47 While the
48
UN Charter nowhere expressly forbids humanitarian intervention per se,
article 2(7) clearly articulates the principle of non-intervention and the
sense of the UN that the United Nations Security Council should conduct
all military intervention under Chapter V1I. 49 Furthermore, article 2(4)
prohibits the use or threat of force against other states. Several UN
Resolutions point towards a strict interpretation of article 2(4)50 as
prohibiting any military action. 51 In particular, the "Declaration on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the
Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty," adopted by the General
Assembly in 1965, emphatically states that interests of sovereignty and
non-intervention preclude intervention on any grounds.52 In 1970, the UN
adopted another Resolution that speaks directly to the possibility of
humanitarian intervention.
Annex II of the "Declaration on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of
States" specifically identifies the duty of a State to "refrain from the
47 See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 41, at 342.
48

See id.

49 Article 2(7) reads "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under
Chapter VII." U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 13, at 4.
SO Article 2(4) reads : "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the

threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Id., art. 2(4), at
4.
5 The prohibition on the use of force has two notable exceptions: self-defense,
authorized by article 51, and collective U.N. action under Chapter VII. Id., arts. 39-51, at
14-17.
52 See G.A. Res. 2131 (=, 14 0 8th plen. mtg., in KEY RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED
1946 - 1996, 26-27 (Dietrich Rauschning et al. eds., 1997).
The Resolution reads in part: "1) No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently,
armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the
personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements is
condemned.... 4) The strict observance of these obligations is an essential condition to
ensure that nations live together in peace with one another, since the practice of any form of
intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations but
also leads to the creation of situations which threaten international peace and security."
NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
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exploitation and the distortion of human rights issues as a means of
interference in the internal affairs of States ....
UN Resolutions are not binding under international law - the
Statute of the I.C.J. recognizes treaties, but not simple resolutions or
declarations. These UN Resolutions should only be used to help interpret
the meaning of the UN Charter itself. Taken as a whole, the UN Charter's
prohibition on the use of force and the principle of non-intervention, as
expressed by various UN Resolutions, seems to outlaw military intervention

of any sort.

E. Conflicting UN Goals: the UN Charteris Committed to
Human Rights
Proponents of intervention counter by arguing that the
establishment of the United Nations has "neither terminated nor weakened
the customary institution of humanitarian intervention. 54 First of all, the
United Nations Charter emphatically stresses the importance of human
rights,55 and requires its members to enforce human rights standards.56 As

human rights have grown in importance in international law, it is no longer
possible to rightly claim that human rights abuses within the borders of a
sovereign state are solely the "internal" affair of that state, Thus, China,
Russia, and other states who continually assert their right to do as they see
fit within their sovereign borders are legally wrong.

5' G.A. Res. 103, U.N. GAOR, 36 th Sess., 91st plen. mtg., at Annex 11(1), U.N. Doc.

A/RES/36/103 (1981). This passage forbids exploitation and distortion of human rights
issues, so it cannot be read to prohibit legitimate humanitarian intervention. Nevertheless,
its tone suggests that intervention on humanitarian grounds will be viewed skeptically and
frowned upon.
54 Michael Reisman, HumanitarianIntervention to Protect the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167, 171 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973). "In terms
of its substantive marrow, the Charter strengthened and extended humanitarian intervention,
in that it confirmed the homocentric character of international law and set in motion a
continuous authoritative process of articulating international human rights, reporting and
deciding infractions, assessing the degree of aggregate realization of human rights, and
appraising its own work." Id. See also Simon, supra, note 10, at 131.
51 See id. at 127 ("The U.N. Charter emphasizes the tremendous importance in
recognizing and promoting human rights worldwide. Article 55 of the Charter is devoted
solely to human rights, 'the United Nations shall promote... universal respect for.., and
observance of, human rights'....").
56 See id ("Article 56 provides 'all members pledge themselves to take joint and separate
action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in
Article 55."')
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The UN clearly articulated this principle in one of its first official
actions: the formation of the Ntirnberg Tribunal. The court that presided
over the Nirnberg Tribunal recognized the fact that the Tribunal itself
represented a significant modification to international law.57 The right of
the Tribunal to try offenses formerly protected by the veil of "sovereignty"
was asserted as "an authoritative expression of general international law. 58
The Tribunal stood for the premise that state sovereignty will not serve to
immunize perpetrators of human rights violations from criminal culpability.
For almost the entire history of the UN, it has recognized that
certain human rights violations are beyond the pale of state sovereignty and
constitute a threat to peace and security.59 Consequently, proponents of
humanitarian intervention argue that the UN has endorsed the notion that
sovereignty is secondary in importance to the basic human right to life. If
the principles first set forth by the Nirnberg Tribunal are followed to their
logical conclusion, humanitarian intervention to prevent war crimes before
they occur is just as defensible as prosecuting war criminals after the crimes
have been committed.
Secondly, the prohibition on armed attack in article 2(4) is intended
to prevent unlawful use of force to undermine the sovereignty, political
independence, and territory of a state. It does not rule out the lawful use of
force, so long as it is not used for one of those purposes. This argument,
fundamentally textual, hinges on the idea that a lawful humanitarian
intervention will not undermine the political or territorial sovereignty of the
state over the affected region, 60 and that any such intervention will not be
inconsistent with the purposes of the UN.6 1
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38, (1949) ('"in the view of the Tribunal... it is the expression of international law existing
at the time of its creation; and to that extent is itself a contribution to international law."')
(alteration in original) (emphasis added).
58 Id.
59 See id. at 71. The Court declared that "international law has... made some claim that
there is a limit to the omnipotence of the State and that the individual human being, the
ultimate unit of all law, is not disentitled to the protection of mankind when the State
tramples upon its rights in a manner which outrages the conscience of mankind." Id.
60 See Barry M. Benjamin, Unilateral HumanitarianIntervention: Legalizing the Use of
Force to Prevent Human Rights Atrocities, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 120, at 149-50 (1992);
see also Krylov, supra note 7, at 383; but see Mary Ellen O'Connell, Regulating the Use of
Force in the 2 1' Century: The Continuing Importance of State Autonomy, 36 COLuM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 473, 474 (arguing that article 2(4) must be construed to mean exactly what it
says: peace is the supreme value in international law, even when it comes at the expense of
human rights).
61 For a detailed analysis of article 2(4) according to international legal principles
regarding treaty interpretation, see TESON, supra note 25, at 146-74. Tes6n concludes that
no method of treaty interpretation leads to a reading of article 2(4) as an absolute prohibition
on humanitarian intervention. See id.
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Finally, article 2(4) does not contemplate situations where the
Security Council is paralyzed and unable to reach consensus on how to
prevent universal crimes. In reserving the authority to conduct military
interventions, the UN presumes its ability to avoid gridlock and take action
where it is appropriate. However, in real-world practice, the UN is
susceptible to the same sort of political pressures that any national
legislative body faces, and thus quite often it will be unable to act even
when it should. 63 Supporters of intervention argue that the right to
intervene should remain as a stopgap measure to be used when the Security
Council is deadlocked and immediate action is required. 64 Ostensibly, this
right to intervene will be strictly circumscribed and governed by
international law.
F. A New Paradigmof Customary Law
Despite the apparent contradictions in the Charter and overall
purposes of the UN, traditionalists maintain that the UN's voice has been
clear regarding the prohibition on the use of force. Nonetheless, the
practice of intervention has continued in the post-UN era. There was
widespread acceptance of Israel's intervention into Uganda during the
Entebbe raid.65 India intervened in East Pakistan in 1973, and while it
eventually relied on its right of self-defense under article 51 of the UN
Charter, India initially defended its action on grounds of humanitarian
need.66 The fact that India even advanced this argument is evidence that it
had "a conception that the practice is required by or consistent with
international law." 67 India's change of position reflects the inherent
problem in humanitarian intervention in the era of the UN Charter.68
India's true motive was to avert tragedy, but it was forced to resort to "legal
gamesmanship" 69 out of fear that its claim would be repudiated.7 °
62 See W. Michael Reisman, Criteriafor the Lawful Use of Force in InternationalLaw,

10 YALE J. INT'L. L. 279, 279-80 (1984).
63 See iL

64 See, e.g., Simon, supra note 10, at 141 ("Since the UN has failed to provide assistance
when it was urgently needed, realists argue that society requires retaining the possibility of a

unilateral use of force.").
65 See id. at 144-45.
66 See Benjamin, supra note 60, at 133. For more on the Indian intervention, see Brian
K. McCalmon, States, Refugees, and Self-Defense, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 215, 231-35.
67 STEINERE AL., supranote 33, at 240.
68 See Benjamin, supra note 60, at 131 ("The Indian intervention in East Pakistan in

1971 ('the India case') is a classic example of the problems associated with interpreting state
practice and ascertaining whether such practice supports the legitimacy of humanitarian
intervention.").
69 IdMat 134.
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The Tanzanian intervention into Uganda, in 1978-1979, is another
important example of humanitarian intervention in the post-Charter era.
After Ugandan forces invaded and annexed Tanzanian territory, Tanzania
launched a military offensive to recapture the territory and then carried the
war into Uganda. With the help of Ugandan insurgents, Tanzanian forces
eventually took the Ugandan capital, Kampala, and toppled the totalitarian
regime of Idi Amin.71
The Tanzanian offensive to remove Idi Amin went far beyond the
legitimate bounds of self-defense under article 51 of the UN Charter.7 2
Though Uganda had first attacked Tanzanian territory, the right of selfdefense does not extend to a punitive
offensive designed to topple the
73
government of the aggressor state. The only justification for Tanzania's
action was a humanitarian one74 - the dictatorship of Idi Amin was brutal in
the extreme, and in eight years of rule, Amin had caused the death of an
estimated 300,000 Ugandans.7 5
The significance of the continued resort to humanitarian
intervention when diplomacy fails is great. It shows, at the very least, that
states are cognizant of some remnant of their right to resort to the use of
force when the cause is just, despite UN prohibitions. However, critics
question whether these scattered instances of humanitarian intervention rise
to the level of "general practice accepted as law."
According to some legal theorists, "general practice" may mean
only a single instance, provided that there is no significant opposition to
it.7 6 Michael Reisman argues that customary law is formed each time an
international incident occurs, based on the way the international community
reacts. Thus, "[a] high degree of actual tolerance for ...unilateral action
70

In fact, India was treated fairly mildly by the UN.

The Security Council took no

action to punish India, and the General Assembly passed a resolution calling on Pakistan to
stop human rights abuses and for both parties to cease hostilities. Some believe this lack of
significant punishment shows the implicit acceptance of the humanitarian argument by the
world community. See, e.g. Simon, supra note 10, at 149.
71 See TESON, supra note 25, at 182-83.
72

See id. at 188.

73 See id.
74 See id. at 195.

71 See Simon, supranote 10, at 150.
76 This formulation of customary international law is known generally as the "New
Haven" approach, and is embodied in the works of Myres McDougal and Michael Reisman.
See TESON, supra note 25, at 17 & n.55.
77 See W. Michael Reisman, InternationalIncidents, in INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS: THE
LAW THAT COuNTS IN WORLD POLITICS 3, 3-24 (W. Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard
eds., 1988), for a discussion on defining international law based on international incidents;
see also Anthony D'Amato, The Theory of Customary International Law, 82 AM. Soc'Y
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- words and other verbal condemnations notwithstanding - may be a signal

that the international community is willing to accept such unilateral military
assertions of right." 8 Customary law is fundamentally a summation of the
accepted standard of behavior, and the expectations of what is acceptable
"are almost entirely derived from the responses of key actors to a critical
79
event.

An important step in this paradigm is to identify what constitutes "a
response" to an international incident. Reisman implies that words of
condemnation alone do not show actual opposition; rather, it is the action of
international elites that should be used to determine the level of acceptance.

"Because they require a greater mobilization of resources, actions often
indicate the resolve of participants better than words; they may also better
reveal the intensity of elite expectations., 8 0 As Professor Chodosh notes,

"[p]ractice may take many forms, both affirmative and negative." 81 The
lack of any action in opposition to an intervention may thus constitute a
"negative" general practice.
If Reisman's theory is correct, then the NATO intervention into
Kosovo clearly demonstrates that a legal right to intervene exists, based on
the lack of any significant international opposition.8 2 This theory of the
formation of new customary legal norms may well justify the Kosovo
operation by way of hindsight; because nobody did anything to stop it or
oppose it, then the law may have embraced it.
INT'L L. PRoc. 242, 246 (1990). Professor D'Amato poses a similar dialectic view of the

formation of customary law:
Can any state ever violate international law? Yes, but with a
qualification. If you have a system that's not statutory and not
precedential, but rather a Hegelian developing system of international
law, then every violation contains the seeds of a new rule. Therefore,
the development of those rules must consist always of violations of
previous rules or else the rules would have frozen centuries ago. So, in
one sense a state can violate international law but in another sense it
creates the law. Now, how can we reconcile these two possibilities?
Well, because of the reactions of other states.
78

Reisman, supra note 77, at 4.

71 Id. at 5.

'o Andrew R. Willard, Incidents: An Essay in Method, in INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS:
THE LAW THAT CoUNTs IN WORLD PoLmcs, supranote 77, at 25, 36.
81

Chodosh, supra note 35, at 100.

82

Many states were opposed to NATO's use of force, but none took significant actionin

opposition by way of sanctions or other measures. According to Reisman, this signifies "[a]
high degree of actual tolerance" for the NATO action. Reisman, supra note 77, at 4.
Professor Christopher Greenwood points out that "a resolution put before the Security
Council condemning the NATO bombing in Serbia was defeated by 12 votes to three on
March 26"h, implying acceptance of the action as legal." Law & Right. When They Don't Fit
Together,supra note 8, at 20.
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The record of state action over the past 50 years clearly suggests
that a right of humanitarian intervention has survived the formation of the
UN. The principles of human rights that form the cornerstone of the United
Nations are built on a very weak foundation indeed if no method of
enforcing them remains. However, it is equally obvious that not every
intervention based on a claim of humanitarian need is a legal intervention.
When the United States intervened in Iran in an attempt to free the
hostages, it was roundly criticized and the ICJ expressed its opinion (in
dicta) that the US had violated international law.83 The difference between
the US intervention in Iran and the Israeli intervention in Uganda are only
made clear if they can be examined using established criteria. In order to
distinguish between the lawful use of force for humanitarian purposes and
the unlawful, pretextual intervention, an analytical framework is required.
II. CRITERIA FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

The major argument against a legal doctrine of humanitarian
84
intervention is that it would open the door to "pretextual" intervention.
Because this legal doctrine is founded in the custom and practice of states,
and because it is so controversial, there has never been a universally
accepted standard established for regulating and evaluating humanitarian
interventions. Whatever standard exists is only that which can be drawn
from the past practice of intervening states, and as such is vague and
malleable. A set of guidelines which provide criteria that observers can use
to determine the legality or illegality of a military intervention would
prevent abuse of the doctrine and enhance its effectiveness as a deterrent to
potential human rights violations.
Any framework proposed will have its critics; nevertheless, it is not
unreasonable to require certain basic criteria that must be met before a
military operation can properly be called a humanitarian intervention. To
begin with, the concept of humanitarian intervention presupposes the
existence of a humanitarian crisis, and the first four factors proposed in this
Note establish the necessary "pre-conditions" allowing humanitarian
intervention. First, the intervening power must be in possession of credible
evidence of the crisis. Second, the evidence must point to the occurrence or
probable occurrence of gross human rights abuses on a large scale. Third,
the intervenor must have exhausted all non-forceful methods of averting the
crisis. Finally, the victims of the human rights abuses must not be opposed
to the intervention.
83

See also Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff In Tehran

(U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
84 See David M. Kresock, "Ethnic Cleansing" in the Balkans: The Legal Foundationsof
Foreign Intervention, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 203, 238 (1994) ("A traditional reason for
preventing unilateral intervention was that it would be widely abused; nations would
intervene for territorial rather than humanitarian reasons.").
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The second set of criteria concern the nature of the military
operation itself, and are really two different ways of demonstrating the
basic humanitarian motives of the intervenor. First, any military
intervention that claims humanitarian justification must limit its primary
objective to ending the crisis, and limit its duration to that time required to
resolve the crisis. Humanitarian reasons must not be concocted or used to
mask ulterior motives.
Second, to the greatest extent possible, a
humanitarian intervention should be multilateral in nature. Multilateralism,
while never an absolute guarantee, is nevertheless often an indicator of the
will of the international community and helps to ensure that the interests of
an individual state do not gain primacy over the basic altruism behind the
intervention.
In this section, each of these six major factors will be developed in
the hope that a workable framework for evaluating humanitarian
intervention can be constructed.
A. Evidence of Human Rights Violations
Evidence is the cornerstone of legality. The first requirement for a
legitimate humanitarian intervention is credible evidence of either existing
or impending gross human rights violations.
Critics of the doctrine of
intervention most often cite the potential for abuse as reason for their
opposition. 86 Requiring credible evidence of a humanitarian crisis would
prevent abuse of the doctrine.
Even with credible evidence, there is a chance for abuse, but it does
not logically follow that any doctrine of intervention will be unworkable.
In reality, "[a]ny individual state action which is permitted, such as selfdefense, may result in potential abuse, but this potential abuse applies to
almost every legal rule."87 The ever-increasing level of global
communications makes it improbable that any state could get away with
such abuse.88 Requiring a high standard of evidence and employing
modem communications and monitoring technology will minimize the

85 Generally, abuse and evidence of it are proportionally related. "The more widespread
the abuse, the easier it is to document and confirm its existence." Benjamin, supra note 60,
at 153.
86 See TES6N, supra note 25, at 108; see also Kresock, supra note 84 at 238; see also

Krylov, supra note 7, at 403-04.
87 Benjamin, supra note 60, at 147; see also Krylov, supra note 7, at 403-04.
88 See Kresock, supra note 84, at 238 ("The modem system of global communication
facilitates confirmation of such [legitimate humanitarian] goals obviating [sic] the need for
such a prohibition. Furthermore, should such an abuse occur, the international community
has quite convincingly demonstrated its ability to remedy such violations.").
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chance of
89 mistake or abuse of power and thereby give legitimacy to the
process.
What constitutes "credible" evidence?
The legitimacy of a
humanitarian intervention will not be decided in a national court, but rather
in the international diplomatic arena. Therefore, whatever evidence forms
the basis of the intervenor's belief that a human rights tragedy is occurring
must be of the sort that the international community will accept as true.
Credibility will thus hinge on both the substance and the source of the
evidence.
1. Substance: Evidence Must Show the Likelihood of
Human Rights Violations
The substance of the evidence is very important, for the world will
not grant legitimacy to a military operation predicated on the mere
suspicion of foul play. Some hard evidence is required. 90 However, the
symptoms of the problem will likely be far more visible than its cause, and
ultimately more compelling. When solid evidence of human rights abuses
is coupled with widespread reports that the abuses are continuous and large
in scale, the international community will likely conclude that the requisite
evidence exists. The example provided by Kosovo, discussed below, goes a
long way toward demonstrating the combination of tangible legal evidence,
reports by human rights observers, military intelligence, and anecdotal
evidence necessary to make the case for intervention.

89

See Benjamin, supra note 60, at 144-46.

Benjamin reasons that the prohibition on

intervention and the protection of state sovereignty is a "remnant of the days when cold war
tensions were divisive, and suspicions about pretextual uses of force were preeminent." Id.
at 144. Modem technologies obviate the need for this prohibition. Benjamin states:
[B]ecause of this advanced technology, the international community can
document human rights atrocities and confirm the actual events
occurring within state borders. A pretextual humanitarian intervention
can be discovered more easily and the state subjected to sanctions.
Meanwhile, altruistic humanitarian interventions will contribute to world
peace and end human suffering.
Id. at 145-46.
90 Paradoxically, concrete legal proof of human rights violations - evidence of the sort
that would stand up in a court of law - is often hard to document until after an intervention,
especially when international observers have been barred from the affected area.
Nonetheless, massive human rights violations are very difficult to hide in the long run, and a
variety of international political organizations and NGOs are well equipped to monitor and
report atrocities.
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2. Source: Evidence Must Be Provided and Accepted
By Objective Observers
The source of the evidence is in many cases even more important
for evaluating credibility than the content of the evidence. Ideally, the
evidence provided will come from independent sources without an interest
at stake in the outcome of the crisis. The closest thing to such an
independent source is the United Nations itself; in theory, the competing
interests of all the member states ensure that it operates with objectivity.9'
Other sources widely regarded as credible will include the various nongovernmental organizations92 dedicated to protecting human rights, such as
Helsinki Watch, Doctors Without Borders, and the International Red Cross.
Finally, evidence provided by the intelligence agencies of the intervening
state or organization can be used to augment the evidence provided by
objective bodies. Evidence provided by a national intelligence agency may
be suspect unless it is supported by evidence from other, disinterested
sources.
It is one thing to collect and present the evidence, it is another to
say with certainty that the evidence has been accepted by the international
community. To require that every state accept evidence of human rights
violations would make intervention impossible. The offending state will
certainly deny wrongdoing, and it may very well persuade its allies that the
evidence has been fabricated or is overblown. In determining the
legitimacy of intervention, one must again look to the degree of acceptance
by the United Nations, which is the only body that can truly claim to speak
for the international community in an objective manner.
B. Gross Human Rights Abuses
Determining the level of violations sufficient to justify intervention
presents a dilemma. Inevitably, any lower limit established will meet with
criticism from human rights groups. On the other hand, allowing
intervention for any human rights violation is akin to having no doctrine at
all; states may claim that policies that are counter to their own are "human
rights violations" and elect to intervene. In order to justify military force,
the human rights violations must meet two conditions. First, they must
violate the highest norms of human rights - the right to life and the right to
be free from physical abuse. Second, the violations themselves must be
widespread and large in scale.
91 It should be noted, however, that the decision-making machinery on the use of force
has been concentrated in the elite group sitting on the Security Council. This situation
invariably gives more weight to the interests of Security Council members, so the objectivity
of the UN is in no way certain. See DJuRA NiNcic, THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE
CHARTER AND INTHE PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 88-98 (1970).
92 Hereinafter "NGOs."
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1. Rights Protected by Humanitarian Intervention
The term "human rights" encompasses a wide variety of physical,
political, and economic rights, most of which were enumerated by the UN
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 3 However, humanitarian
intervention is a remedy designed only to protect the highest and most
basic, physical human rights - the right to life, and the right to be free from
to justify an aggressive95
torture and physical abuse. It would be hard
94
military action to protect the right to marriage, the right to a free press,
or the right to unionize,96 all of which are enumerated in the Declaration.
While these rights are very important, they do not involve an immediate
risk of9 physical injury or death, and they lack the urgency required to justify
a war.

2. Level of Abuse Warranting Intervention
Similarly, humanitarian intervention cannot be used to prevent a
very small-scale violation of human rights. The imminent death of 100,000
refugees may well justify a full-scale military intervention, but the unlawful
execution of one political prisoner would not. It is impossible to quantify
exactly what would constitute the minimum required number of deaths, and
such an exercise would be inhumane and degrading to the very values that
human rights seek to uphold. Therefore, the standard for a justifiable
intervention must remain vague; humanitarian intervention is only proper
when human rights violations are "large-scale".
The conventional solution to this problem is to apply a "shock the
conscience" standard, under which intervention is warranted when the
human rights violations place many people in immediate danger of injury or
loss of life.98 This standard requires a diplomatic solution to controversies
where rights are violated, but where the threat of death or serious injury to
many people is not present. The "shock the conscience" standard therefore
requires proof of human rights abuses likely to lead to the physical harm or
death of a large group of people before force can be used as a response.
93 See Universal Declaration on Human Rights, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW,

supra note 13, at 250.

94 See id., art. 16, at 253.

9' See id., art. 19, at 254.
96 See id., art. 23(4), at 254.
97 See Krylov, supra note 7, at 392. Krylov argues that "[T~he response should match
the abuse, and interventions should not be allowed for small-scale abuses." Id.
98 The conventional standard for humanitarian intervention was articulated by
Oppenheim, who stated in 1905 that atrocities which "stagger humanity" would warrant
intervention by outside powers. See HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED
NATIONS 170 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973) (citing L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 347
(1905)).
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Torture, expulsion, systematic rape, war crimes, and genocide are examples
of abuses that would satisfy this standard. This should not be understood to
mean that other human rights are not worthy of protection, nor that a single
individual's rights are unimportant. The "shock the conscience" standard
merely limits the circumstances where military force will be an acceptable
method of protecting of human rights.
C. Exhaustion of Non-Forcible Options
Use of force must be the last resort when a state or group of states
attempts to resolve a humanitarian crisis. To the greatest extent possible,
other means, such as diplomacy, sanctions, 99 and the efforts of
humanitarian relief agencies ° ° must be employed before exercising the
military option during "the period of time
10 1 during which the humanitarian
need has not reached crisis dimensions.
However, since most human rights crises are by definition
emergencies, many of those other means may not be practical. To require
that every other means must be exhausted would make every humanitarian
intervention ineffective by virtue of being too late to prevent a tragedy.
Exhaustion in the context of a humanitarian crisis should thus be a two-step
process, with a "pre-crisis" phase and a crisis phase. During the "precrisis" phase, as tension in the region builds and indications of what is to
come arise, other methods of preventing the tragedy are required. These
include trade sanctions, political pressure, and attempts at mediation. Once
the crisis begins, a state or group of states can intervene unilaterally only
99 See Scheffer, supra note 9, at 291 (arguing that military intervention should be
undertaken only when "[a]Iternative peaceful remedies, including economic sanctions, have
been exhausted ....).
100It is here that non-military means of "intervention" should be employed. See icL at
266-67.
Humanitarian intervention should be understood to encompass nonconsensual, non-forcible methods, namely intervention undertaken
without military force to alleviate mass human suffering within
sovereign borders. This type of intervention would include the work of
non-governmental organizations, such as the International Committee of
the Red Cross ("ICRC") and the Medicins sans Frontieres, which
normally interfere only with the consent of the subject government, but
sometimes operate on hostile territory with the ignorance of or grudging
acquiescence by governmental authorities....
Another type of non-forcible humanitarian intervention is
represented by the actions of the UN Security Council in insisting on the
provision of humanitarian assistance....
Id.
oId. at 29 1.
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when faced with a deadlocked Security Council.102 By attempting to
initiate Security Council action, the intervening power adds further weight
to the legitimacy 0of
3 the intervention by establishing a record of
humanitarian intent.'
This criterion assumes that there will be an adequate period of time
for the international community to act to defuse the crisis before it reaches
the critical point - a true "pre-crisis" phase. However, it is possible that a
humanitarian crisis may erupt suddenly, catching the world by surprise. In
that case, a Security Council deadlock will allow for immediate
intervention, without requiring the exhaustion of non-forcible methods.
D. Desire of the Victims for InternationalRelief
The right of states to be free of the fear of foreign intervention is
fundamental. However, the people who live in that state also have
fundamental human rights that outweigh the rights of the state. 10 4 It
follows, therefore, that when a group of people whose human rights are
being systematically abused by their own government actually wants
international protection, theirs are the primary rights that need to be
enforced. "[U]nless the victims themselves prefer to tolerate their
government ratherthan see their state invaded. .,
there is no right to
autonomy worth protecting.
An understanding of this fundamental prioritization of rights leads
to the conclusion that a humanitarian intervention can only be legitimate
when "the victims of human rights violations welcome the foreign
invasion." 10 6 According to Professor Tes6n, this requirement is met when
"subjects are actually willing to revolt against their tyrannical
government."' 10 7 On the other hand, if the evidence suggests that the
102David Scheffer says unilateral intervention is legal when "[t]he Security Council is
deadlocked indefinitely on the issue and has not explicitly prohibited intervention to meet
the humanitarian crisis." Id.at 290.
103 See Benjamin, supra note 60, at 156-57. Benjamin argues that:

[legalization of humanitarian intervention should not require the
intervenor to exhaust all peaceful means to prevent abuse before acting,
but the steps an intervening state does employ before using force is
probative of the legality of the intervention .... A state with altruistic
motives, however, would be exonerated if it acted hastily in the face of
impending danger.
Id.
104See TESON, supra note 25, at 53.
05 Id.at 91.

'o'
Id. at 126.
107 Id. Tes6n further qualifies this requirement. "For there are situations where tyrants
exercise extreme forms of terror . . ." that make it impossible for the victims to formally
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"victims" prefer to tolerate the abuse rather than see a foreign power
intervene, humanitarian intervention cannot be allowed.
In attempting to determine whether this standard has been met,
allowance must be made for the effects of a tyrannical government on the
willingness or the ability of the oppressed people to speak out. The fact
that the victims make no formal request for international relief cannot be
taken as a sign that they would prefer to see the abuse continue rather than
allow foreign intervention. On the other hand, care must be taken to ensure
that any request for international relief comes from a person or organization
that is truly representative of the will of the oppressed populace. A rogue
leader of a minor faction calling for intervention does not meet this test.
There must be evidence that the populace as a whole desires relief.
E. Limited Force
Humanitarian intervention is founded on the idea that when human
rights and state sovereignty come in conflict, certain human rights will
trump state sovereignty as an international legal norm. 0 8 Implicit in this
idea is the fact that state sovereignty remains of great importance. It would
be a misinterpretation of the doctrine to say that sovereignty has no value in
the face of human rights abuse. In formulating a workable doctrine of
intervention, it is therefore important that state sovereignty remains a norm
that is protected to the greatest degree possible. This can be accomplished
by imposing limits in both objective and duration on the actions of the
intervenor that will provide pressure on the intervenor to keep the
intervention focused on providing humanitarian relief.
1. Limited Objective
The sole objective of intervention must be to end the humanitarian
emergency and prevent its resurgence. The purposes of the intervention
should not be extended to include territorial conquest or liberation, the
break-up of a state, or the toppling of a government. Such aims would
destroy the disinterested humanitarian intent that is required for a legitimate
intervention. In acting within the territory of a sovereign state, every
attempt must be made to comply with the spirit of article 2(4) of the UN
Charter, which forbids "the threat or use of force against the territorial
request, or even openly acknowledge their desire for, foreign intervention. Id. "In most
cases the victims of oppression must actually be willing to receive outside help." Id.
However, where repression is so extreme that such a request is impossible, it may still be
legitimate to intervene if such a desire manifests itself in other less obvious ways.
108 Thus, Brownlie describes humanitarian intervention as involving "no change in
sovereignty" because a state that commits human rights abuses has "abused its sovereignty"
and "made itself liable to action by any state which was prepared to intervene." BROWNLIE,
supra note 41, at 338. This model regards sovereignty as maintaining its full importance sovereignty is not lost when intervention occurs, merely waived in the face of a higher norm.
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integrity or political independence of any State, 1 or
in any manner
9
inconsistent with the Purposesof the United Nations."'
This basic recipe for limited objectives immediately runs into
problems when applied to the real world. Rational state actors are simply
not capable of completely separating considerations of self-interest from
decisions to use force,'1 ° nor should they be expected or required to. It is
the careful consideration of self-interest that often makes use of force the
option of last resort instead of first. Military operations are too costly and
risky to be undertaken lightly. Furthermore, ending the humanitarian crisis
may require the removal of a hostile regime; this may be a secondary
objective, but it clouds the issue when attempting to determine the basic
humanitarian motives behind an intervention.
It goes without saying that virtually no military action will be
completely free of self-interest. However, the requirement is simply that
the basic interest of human rights is foremost, not that it be the exclusive
interest.'
"Just cause for war is stopping the willful violation of human
rights."'1 2 The intervenor must be able to show that while self-interests
may also be present, the primary motivation for the military action is the
preservation of human rights and not the acquisition of territory or the
military overthrow of a hostile regime. As is evident in Kosovo, this
balancing of interests proves difficult when protecting human rights
requires the overthrow of a regime antithetical to humanitarian goals.
2. Limited Duration
Closely linked to the limited objectives are limits in duration of the
intervention. The intervenor must not remain in occupation of the
sovereign territory of another state any longer than necessary to accomplish
the humanitarian mission.1 13 This prevents humanitarian reasons from
being used to mask an otherwise naked land-grab. The limited duration of a
unilateral intervention should be monitored and enforced by the United
Nations.

109

U.N.

CHARTER,

art. 2(4), reprinted in

BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,

supra note 13 (emphasis added).
110 See TES6N, supra note 25, at 108 ("[1]n international affairs, states are very rarely
impartial, and their own interests are bound to weigh heavily in shaping their policies.")

(quoting S.I. BENN

&

R.S.

PETERS, SOCIAL PRINCIPLES AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE
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(1959)).
111See Krylov, supra note 7, at 397-98 ("The intervening states' motives are particularly
important. To constitute humanitarian intervention, these motives should be genuinely
humanitarian.").
112 TESON, supra note 25, at 106.
113

See Simon, supranote 10, at 152.
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There are several problems with this factor. What is the intervenor
to do when the humanitarian crisis has been averted but the political or
cultural conditions make it inevitable that conditions of chaos will return if
the intervenor leaves? What about independence movements? What is the
role of the UN in all of this?
NATO will have to promptly address these questions in Kosovo.
The fundamental inquiry lies in whether the right to intervene brings with it
a duty to remain as a guarantor of continued protection of human rights.
For reasons outlined in the next section, it is more logical to presume that
the right does create a duty, and that an intervenor may have to stay as long
as necessary.
Hopefully, conditions will so normalize that the intervenor can
withdraw without fear of resurgence in the crisis. This may result from a
political solution to the problem, or from the UN agreeing to take over the
peacekeeping mission after the crisis is averted. Whatever the reason for
withdrawal, requiring a limitation in duration helps to avoid pretextual
interventions and annexation of territory. Just as with the level of abuse
required for intervention, this standard must remain somewhat vague,
requiring that the intervenor not stay any longer than necessary to restore
peace and security. A more specific time frame will inevitably cause
problems in real-world application, as intervenors scramble to meet the
withdrawal deadline, often at the cost of the very peace and security they
hoped to provide. This standard will be difficult to enforce, but insisting on
it will help ensure that intervenors are conscious of the need to maintain the
legitimacy of their intervention by avoiding annexation or indefinite
occupation of the territory of another sovereign state.
F. Multilateralism
Humanitarian intervention should be multilateral whenever
possible. The more states that are involved in the intervention, the greater
the legitimacy of the intervention,' 1 4 and therefore the less likelihood of an
abuse of the doctrine.' 15 However, this should not be understood to require
114Barry M. Benjamin notes that "[w]hile collective action does not legitimize the action,

seeking the cooperation of other states in the face of inaction by the United Nations ... lends
credibility to a claim of intervention based largely on altruistic motives. When other states
apart from the intervenor agree with the use of force, such collective action is probative of
the action's genuine character." Benjamin, supra note 60, at 155; see also Krylov, supra
note 7, at 396-97 (explaining that collective action is preferable to unilateral action).
11 W.E. Hall, though opposing the legality of intervention, conceded that:
[a] somewhat wider range of intervention than that which is possessed
by individual states may perhaps be conceded to the body of states, or to
some of them acting for the whole in good faith with sufficient warrant.
In the general interests of Europe, for example, an end might be put to a
civil war by the compulsory separation of the parties to it, or a particular
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6
the presence of more than one state's military forces in the affected area.'
It may be that only one state will have the logistical capacity and requisite
military power to intervene. Rather, this criterion requires that the
endorsement of intervention be multilateral. A humanitarian intervention
must be supported by many voices, and the existence of a humanitarian
crisis be accepted by the world community as a whole. Any signs that the
UN has endorsed intervention will further add to its legitimacy.

III. CRITERIA APPLIED TO Kosovo
The criteria outlined above are not original; rather they are largely a
synthesis or restatement of the ideas of earlier commentators on
intervention and observations of the past practice of intervening states. As
such, one may not properly call these criteria the "new" law of intervention.
Yet, at the very least, they provide a framework for analysis of operations
like the one in Kosovo. Ultimately, it is the interventions themselves, and
the reaction of the world to them, that will shape the international law of
armed conflict. However, if legal scholars can agree on a set of standards
to evaluate these interventions, the doctrine itself will become more widely
accepted and its effectiveness as a deterrent will be enhanced. With that in
mind, the next section will focus on how well the Kosovo intervention
holds true to the principles and requirements outlined above and on what
kind of precedent it sets for future interventions.
A. Evidence of Human Rights Violations in Kosovo
In building the case for intervention in Kosovo, the UN and NATO
possessed a large amount of evidence of human rights abuses. UN
observers on the ground tracked the refugee situation as it approached crisis
dimensions. 1 7 The evidence pointed toward an organized campaign to rid
Kosovo of its Albanian majority, by whatever means necessary. 18 The
volume of evidence obtained, and the extent to which that evidence was
family or a particular form of government might be established and
maintained in a country, if the interests to be guarded were strictly
international, and if the maintenance of the state of things set up were a
reasonable way of attaining the required object.
SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 142. Hall, though writing morb than a hundred
years before the war in Kosovo, unknowingly advanced some of the same arguments for
intervention into Yugoslavia. This passage also bears particular relevance to the limitation
on the goal of the intervenor, since Hall implied that dissolution of the sovereign state may
not exceed the bounds of intervention.
116Benjamin calls multilateralism a "useful caveat," as opposed to an "absolute
prerequisite." Benjamin supra, note 60, at 154, 152.
117See infra notes 119-133 and accompanying text.
118See

id.
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available to the international community, set a new standard for the legal
use of force. NATO presented its case very well, and substantially raised
the bar for future actors contemplating intervention. The content and the
source of this evidence will be the focus of the discussion below.
1. Substance: Evidence Pointed to Widespread,
Systematic Human Rights Violations
Initially, the evidence provided a startling picture of the developing
crisis in Kosovo. For several years, Serb military and paramilitary forces
had been engaged in a low-level conflict with Kosovo Liberation Army
rebels advocating an autonomous or independent Kosovo. However, what
began as a police operation shortly became an organized purge of the
civilian population. 9 By late 1998, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees' 2 0 estimated that "the indiscriminate use of
force by [Yugoslav forces] ... resulted in numerous civilian casualties and.
. the displacement of over 230,000 persons from their homes ....,121. A
few months later, a scant two weeks before the NATO bombing began, the
UNHCR increased its estimate, stating "the year-long conflict has driven
400,000 people out of their homes.' 2 The UNHCR also reported that
"shelling and intimidation by the security forces and the Yugoslav Army
are not only causing Albanian villagers to flee, but are fueling a cycle of
violence and fear .. .
Compounding the problem, Yugoslav forces
continued to harass Albanians as they attempted to escape, and were
actively hindering efforts to provide relief. 124
119 See U.S. Department of State, Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo (visited

Sept. 16, 2000) <http:llwww.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt_9905_ethinic-ksvo_2.html>.
120 Hereinafter "UNHCR."
121 UN SC Resolution 1160.
122 Ogata Says Situation Deterioratingin Kosovo, Urges Action to Avert Disaster (last
modified Mar. 11, 1999) <http:llwww.unhcr.chlnews/pr/pr99031 1.htm>.
123 Id.
124 USAID

reported that:

[r]elief organizations continue to experience incidents of harassment and
physical assault by Serb forces and civilians. In one of these incidents, a
soldier in a Yugoslav Army (VJ) truck smashed the windshield of a
mobile clinic vehicle with a bat .... In another incident, a brick was
thrown through the rear window of an NGO vehicle as it traveled
through Pristina .... On March 9, the VJ denied an assessment team,
two mobile health clinics, and one water/sanitation team access to two
villages .... On March 12, a joint UNHCR/NGO assessment team was
unsuccessful, for the third day in a row, in locating IDPs [internally
displaced persons] living in the open hills ...due to ongoing conflict...

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 33:111

Hard evidence of specific war crimes was also coming to light. A
UN humanitarian team uncovered evidence of a mass execution in early
January, 25 and reports by journalists and NGOs of many other such
incidents were plentiful. Often, Yugoslav forces made it difficult to pin
down the exact nature and location of alleged mass executions by
destroying evidence and transporting bodies by truck to be buried away
from the site of their death. 126 Nevertheless, observers on the ground were
able to correlate accounts provided by refugees with discoveries of actual
mass graves.
By March 20, 1999, a humanitarian emergency faced the world.
UN observers gazed in shock as the stream of refugees grew into a flood of
incredible proportions.
The UN reports were supported by NATO
intelligence indicating that, on March 20, the day after OSCE12 7 observers
were withdrawn from Kosovo, the Yugoslav army launched a final
campaign to forcibly expel thousands of Albanians from their homes. 28 In
Pristina, thousands of Albanians were rounded up and expelled from the
city, and parts of the city were shelled by the Yugoslav army. Though this
USAID Kosovo Fact Sheet #11 (last modified Mar. 18, 1999) <http://www.usaid.gov/
humresponse/ofda/kosofs 1.html>.
125 See id.; see also NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo (last modified July
15, 1999) <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm> ("In January 1999, evidence was
discovered, by a United Nations humanitarian team, of the massacre of over 40 people in the
village of Racak."). The massacre at Racak was the incident that prompted Louise Arbour,
Chief Prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, to issue
an indictment of Slobodan Milosevic and four of his top lieutenants on May 22, 1999. They
were charged with deportation (a crime against humanity), murder (a crime against humanity
and a violation of the laws or customs of war), and persecutions based on political, racial,
and religious grounds (a crime against humanity). See Indictment of Slobodan Milosevic, et
al., presentedat the International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, The Hague,
The Netherlands, May 22, 1999, available at <http://www.state.gov/www/ regions/
eur/990527_kosovo.indictment.html> (last visited Sept. 17, 1999).
126 See Report: Kosovo Killings 'crime against humanity', (Mar. 17,
1999)

<http://www.isgkc.org/2cnn031799.htm>. Other times, however, Yugoslav soldiers were
quite brazen and made no attempt to hide the atrocities they committed.
[T]he news from Kosovo is of a truck load of bodies driven into one of
the villages targeted by the Serb security police and dumped in a central
square. The people of the village, Srbica, were told to claim and bury
their dead before Serbia dumped them into a mass grave. An Associated
Press television crew was invited to film the spectacle.
Michael Moran, Ethnic Cleansing, Act II, in Kosovo, (Mar. 9, 1998) <http://www.isgkc.org/
lmsnbc03O998.htm>.
127The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
128See

U.S. Department of State, Kosovo Chronology: Timeline of events 1989-1999

Relating to the Crisis in Kosovo (visited Sept. 8, 2000) <http//:www.state.gov/www/
regions/eur/fs kosovotimeline.html>.
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incident occurred after the bombing campaign began, the expulsion of
citizens from Pristina "followed a certain pattern and was conceivably
organized well in advance."' 29
The past practice of ethnic cleansing 130 by Serbs in Bosnia, and the
last decade of Yugoslav policy in Kosovo,'I made the mounting evidence
of a pattern of forced expulsion and killing even more compelling. The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 13 2 had
extensively documented Serb war crimes in Bosnia, 133 and media reports
indicated that the policy of ethnic cleansing had been orchestrated and
supported by the leadership in Belgrade. 3 4 Aggressive action by Belgrade
in suppressing Albanian political movements and destroying Albanian
culture during the period 1992 to 1999135 painted a picture of a similar
campaign to drive Albanians from Yugoslavia and create an ethnically pure
state. 136
One notable failure on the part of NATO was the underestimation
of abuse perpetrated by the Kosovo Liberation Army13 7 against Serbs.
KLA "freedom fighters" had been bombing and assassinating prominent
Serbs for years in Kosovo. 138 NATO reports during the crisis tended to
paint a one-sided picture, which overlooked the terrorist acts of the KLA.
However, while KLA abuses were serious (and have continued since the
NATO occupation), 139 one must avoid the temptation to use them to justify
129 Steven

Erlanger, Monitors' Reports Provide Chronicle of Kosovo Terror,N.Y. TIMES,

Dec. 5, 1999, at 1.
130Ethnic cleansing has been described as "a well orchestrated plan of elimination of a
group of people, from a certain territory, with the goal that they not return, by means that
cover the range of international humanitarian law violations." M. CHERiF BASSOUINI &
BASSIOUNI PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA §8.5.1.1, at 611 (1996).
131 Following the rise to power of Milosevic in 1989, Kosovo was deprived of
its
traditional autonomy within Yugoslavia and brought under the direct control of Belgrade, a
move vigorously opposed by the Kosovars. See NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in
Kosovo, supra note 125.
132Hereinafter "ICTY."
133See

generally BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 130, app. I, at 65.

1s4See Roger Cohen, C.IA. Report Faults Serbs in 90% of Bosnia Ethnic Cleansing,N.Y.

TIMES, Mar. 9, 1995, at Al.
135See Kosovo Chronology, supranote 128.
136OSCE

reports prepared from refugee interviews clearly indicate the intent of the Serbs

to destabilize their neighbors and destroy ethnic Albanian monetary and political power. See
Erlanger, supranote 129.
137 Hereinafter "KLA."
138

This behavior has continued since the NATO occupation of Kosovo.

See Paul

Watson, Reports Detail Cycle of Violence in Kosovo, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1999, at A9.
139See id.

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 33:111

the actions of the Yugoslav government. At the same time, NATO must
put an end to retributive violence by ethnic Albanians against their former
0
oppressors if the credibility of its peacekeeping mission is to survive.14
Kosovo provides us with a clear and convincing record when it
comes to establishing evidence of human rights abuses. As time goes on,
and the work of the ICTY brings more forensic evidence to light, the full
picture of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo can be pieced together. 14' In a
shocking discovery in early 2001, investigative reporters apparently
uncovered evidence that hundreds, and possibly thousands, of Albanian
bodies were incinerated in an attempt to destroy evidence of war crimes. 42
According to Serbian sources who participated in the destruction of these
bodies, this effort to mask the atrocities was done "under orders from
Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic's senior commanders."' 143 NATO
Commander General Wesley Clark was in possession of satellite photos
which showed the convoy of bulldozers and trucks dispatched to the site
shortly after it was named in the UN indictment of Milosevic for war
crimes. 144 Thus, at the time NATO decided to intervene, it possessed
substantive evidence that clearly showed the existence of a widespread
pattern of killing, torture, and forced expulsion, and an effort reminiscent of
that undertaken by the Nazis in the closing days of World War II to
eliminate evidence of these crimes.
2. Source: Wide Variety of Sources and Objective
Nature of Reports Lent Credibility to NATO's Case
States contemplating intervention in some future conflict will have
to take note of the extent and objectivity of the sources NATO used to make
140The

UN police force sent in to augment NATO military peacekeepers has begun to

redress this problem, arresting Albanians who continue to attack Serbs. See UN Police
Arrest Kosovo Albaniansfor Murders, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 20, 1999, available in
LEXIS Newsfile.
141
The U.S. State Department has now adjusted its estimate of the total number of
Albanians killed by direct Serb action to 10,000. To date, war crimes investigators have
exhumed 2,108 bodies from mass graves (according to ICTY investigators). In addition,
State Department estimates of the number of displaced persons in Kosovo has been revised
upward to 1.5 million. See Philip Shenon, State Dept. Now Estimates Serbian Drive Killed
10,000, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1999, at A12.
142See All Things Considered, Burning the Evidence: Kosovo War Crimes (NPR radio
broadcast, Jan. 25, 2001).
143Id.
144Id. General Clark recognized what was probably going on. "Not only had the Serbs
killed civilians and were trying to hide them, but there was a system behind this in which
they were responding to discoveries [announced by the ICTY]. And so for us, this was an
important finding. It deepened the recognition that the Serb high command in some way
was involved in this." Id.
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its case before taking action in Kosovo. NATO combined its own military
and civilian intelligence, reports from UNHCR and OSCE observers on the
ground, refugee interviews conducted by humanitarian relief organizations,
and media coverage to paint a clear and convincing picture of a crisis in
need of immediate resolution. The many and varied sources of evidence,
employing the whole range of modem communications and monitoring
technologies, as well as old-fashioned, on-the-spot investigations and
refugee interviews, gave this evidence a credibility that was hard to dispute.
The credibility of the evidence was further enhanced by the objective,
disinterested nature of the sources, particularly the UNHCR and the OSCE.
As precedent, Kosovo therefore set a relatively high standard for the
evidentiary requirement. Future intervenors must ensure that similarly
disinterested observers provide and verify evidence of humanitarian crisis
before intervening.
B. Gross Human Rights Violations: Nature of Rights Being
Violated, and Scale of the Violations, WarrantedIntervention
The crisis in Kosovo placed hundreds of thousands of people in
grave danger of losing their lives, and so the basic requirement of
impending physical harm was clearly present. Gross human rights
violations on a scale that warranted international military protection had
occurred. The forced expulsion of ethnic Albanians left them without
protection from the elements. In Resolution 1199, the Security Council
pointed out that "50,000 [refugees] [were] without shelter and basic
necessities .. . ."145 as the winter months approached. UNHCR reported
children "dying in the cold."'146 The ongoing abuse by Serb forces, the
massacres, and the indiscriminate shelling were verified by a wide variety
of objective observers. These violations constituted a grave threat to life
and "shocked the conscience" of the NATO countries. The level of human
rights abuses in Kosovo did not substantially alter international law, as
forced expulsion and mass execution ("ethnic cleansing") 1were
already
47
clearly recognized as human rights offenses of a grave nature.
However, it was not until the OSCE observers were withdrawn and
the Serbs launched their largest offensive that NATO chose to intervene. 48
NATO could have made a good case for intervention several months before
the war, as the Yugoslav offensive had created hundreds of thousands of

145 S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 53Pd Sess., 3930 th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doe. S/RES/l199

(1998).
146 Kosovo: Ogata Condemns Atrocities, Appeals for Access (last modified Jan. 18, 1999)
<http:llwww.unhcr.ch/news/pr/pr990118.htm>.
147 See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 130,
148See

Kosovo Chronology,supra note 128.

§ 1.5.2, at 48.

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 33:111

refugees by late 1998.149 However, until the unsatisfactory conclusion of
the Rambouillet peace talks, NATO still held out hope that a diplomatic
solution could be reached. When the Yugoslav army began its final push,
diplomacy had clearly failed. A line had been crossed that made
intervention an option. This illustrates the principle of exhaustion resorting to force only after all other means had failed.
C. Exhaustion of Non-Forcible Options
The NATO intervention in Kosovo sets a good example of
exhaustion, as diplomacy in the "pre-crisis" phase had failed, and the UN
Security Council was deadlocked. Deadlock is a problematic issue,
difficult to demonstrate conclusively and yet impossible to ignore. Kosovo
illustrates some of the problems increasingly evident in the structure of the
UN Security Council, and why it is likely that deadlock will persist as an

impediment to resolution of humanitarian crises.
1. Pre-Crisis Diplomatic Initiatives Had Failed
The Kosovo operation was preceded by months 15 of diplomatic
efforts to resolve the region's problems peacefully.151 The United
Nations, 152 the OSCE, 153 NATO, 54 the US, and the Balkans "Contact

149
See Ogata Says Situation Deterioratingin Kosovo, Urges Action to Avert Disaster,
supra note 122.
150Indeed, Richard Holbrooke's account of the Dayton Peace talks during the Bosnian
crisis shows that at least initial diplomatic efforts to forestall the Kosovo crisis were taken
several years before military action. See HOLBROOKE, supra note 19, at 234 (recounting
Holbrooke's disagreement with Milosevic over whether or not Kosovo was an internal
matter).
151 For a chronology of events, including major diplomatic initiatives, see Kosovo
Chronology,supra note 128.
152 See S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 53d' Sess., 38681h mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/i 160
(1998); see also S.C. Res. 1199, supranote 145.
153The OSCE, in a decision a full year before the start of the NATO bombing campaign,
expressed its disapproval of Yugoslavia's policies, and authorized increased monitoring of
the situation by OSCE civilian and military observers. In a strongly worded statement, the
OSCE called upon the Yugoslav government to "initiate a meaningful dialogue with [the
Kosovars] which will lead to... resolution of ongoing political problems.. ." and to "allow
access to Kosovo for the International Committee of the Red Cross and other humanitarian
organizations." Org. for Sec. & Co-operation in Eur., Decision 218 on the Situation in
Kosovo, Mar. 11, 1998.
154 NATO threatened air strikes on October 13, 1998, in an attempt to add force to
diplomatic efforts. See NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo, supra note 125.
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Group, 155 all participated in increasingly urgent diplomatic moves in an
effort to curb the violence and reach a political solution.
The diplomatic efforts increased throughout the year before the
war. In September 1998, the UN Security Council issued a formal demand
for the cessation of hostilities by Serb forces against the Kosovars. UN
Security Council Resolution 1199 stated in part:
[a]cting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations, [the Security Council] . . . [d]emands that all
parties, groups and individuals immediately cease
hostilities and maintain a ceasefire in Kosovo, Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, which would enhance the
prospects for a meaningful dialogue between the
authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
Kosovo Albanian leadership and reduce the risks of a
humanitarian catastrophe.
156
The invocation of Chapter VII gave Yugoslavia clear notice that the
international community regarded the human rights abuses in
Kosovo as a grave threat to international security and a violation of
accepted human rights standards. In short, the UN, the OSCE,
NATO, and the US all devoted massive diplomatic efforts towards a
peaceful solution.
The diplomatic effort culminated in February 1999. The
Rambouillet peace talks, where the Contact Group attempted to coax
157
a settlement out of the Yugoslav government and the Kosovars,
ended without a satisfactory settlement. 158 Despite reaching an
"interim agreement," the talks soon deteriorated and the fighting
resumed. 159
155 The Contact Group established by the London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia
sponsored the Rambouillet peace talks. See id.
156 S.C. Res. 1199, supra note 145.
157 Though conducted by the Contact Group, the Rambouillet talks were endorsed by the
UN Security Council, the EU, and the OSCE. See Robin Cook, Opening Remarks at the
Kosovo Peace Talks (Feb. 6, 1999) (transcript available at <http://www.Britaininfo.org/bistest/fordom/Balkans/kosovo/6feb99-2.stm> (visited Nov. 18, 1999)).
158 The Interim Agreement signed by the Kosovars (but not the Yugoslav government) at
Rambouillet included guarantees of political autonomy for the Kosovars and continuing
sovereignty over the region by Belgrade. See Rambouillet Interim Agreement (visited Sept.
1, 2000) <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo__rambouillettext.html>.
159 When the Yugoslav government refused to sign the Rambouillet Accords, the CoChairs of the Kosovo Peace Talks (French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine and British
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook) issued a terse statement, insisting that the Rambouillet
Accords were the "only peaceful solution to the problem" and accusing the Yugoslavs of
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2. Security Council Was Deadlocked as Situation
Became Critical
By early March 1999, the situation had become grave. Thousands
were suspected dead or missing, and hundreds of thousands of refugees
massed on the Yugoslav-Macedonian border were in immediate danger of
losing their lives. A true humanitarian crisis now existed. At this time the
UN should have intervened. However, the UN could not do so because the
Security Council was deadlocked on whether to authorize military action.' 60
In the face of a paralyzed Security Council, and cognizant of the UN's
earlier failure to avert the crisis in Bosnia, 161 NATO elected to act
unilaterally. The fact that the Security Council would not act allows NATO
to rightfully claim that all other means had been exhausted.
One criticism of the NATO action is that the UN Security Council
took no formal vote on UN intervention because Russia and China had
made it clear that they would veto such a proposal. 16 The US and NATO
did not want to risk a "no" vote, because it may have been construed as an
express prohibition on unilateral intervention. However, without the
existence of a recorded vote, critics question whether there was true
deadlock in the Security Council.
Despite the lack of an official recorded vote, deadlock was readily
apparent to all observers even before the crisis broke out. 163 The UN had
trying to "unravel the Rambouillet Accords". Hubert Vedrine and Robin Cook, Statement of
Co-Chairs of Kosovo Peace Talks (Mar. 19, 1999) (transcript available at
<http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/statements/htm> (visited Sept. 20, 2000). The Co-Chairs,
speaking for the Balkans Contact Group, went on to "solemnly warn the authorities in
Belgrade against any military offensive on the ground and any impediment to the freedom of
movement and of action of the [Kosovars] .... Id.
160 No formal vote was taken on UN intervention, most likely because of the implied
threat of a veto by China, Russia, or both. See Elisabeth Zingg, Beliing on the same wavelength as Moscow on Kosovo, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (Mar. 24, 1999). According to this
report, "China has repeatedly voiced in recent days strong in-principle opposition to military
intervention in Yugoslavia, calling for Western countries to find a political solution to the
crisis." Id. China called the problem "an internal affair of Yugoslavia" and called for the
problem to be solved "through dialogue on the basis of respect for the sovereignty and the
territorial integrity of Yugoslavia .... ." Id. For an example of Russian opposition to
intervention, see Xenia Kolpakova, Russia Duma Speaker Against NATO Intervention in
Kosovo, ITAR-TASS NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 19, 1999).
161 See HOLBROOKE, supra, note 19.

162 China's foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan said in a speech before the UN General
Assembly that non-intervention and respect for sovereignty are "'the basic principles
governing international relations' and decried "such arguments as 'human rights taking
precedence over sovereignty' and 'humanitarian intervention."' Barbara Crossette, China
and Others Reject Pleas that the UN Halt Civil Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 23, 1999, at A13.
163 See Judith Miller, Security Council Relegated to Sidelines, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 14, 1999,
late edition, at 14. Reasons for the increasing ineffectiveness of the Security Council are

20011

HUMANITARIAN ENTERVENTION

been increasingly ineffective at averting such tragedies since Somalia, with
notable failures in Rwanda and Bosnia.' 64 A paralyzed Security Council
was unable to act in either case to prevent a horrible humanitarian
tragedy.1 65 The NATO powers had no reason to expect anything different
166
in regard to Kosovo, which put Yugoslavia (a traditional ally of Russia)
in direct opposition to NATO.
While Russia defended Yugoslav
sovereignty based on ethnic and political ties, China did so to avoid any
action that could later be used to undermine the legitimacy of Chinese
occupation of Tibet. 67 It was clear that hundreds of thousands would die
while the UN continued to debate the merits of intervention. Furthermore,
NATO rightly feared that the instability caused by these universal crimes,
and the spillover of refugees into Macedonia and Albania, could potentially
spread the conflict into another Balkan war.
168 Faced with this unacceptable
situation, NATO elected to act unilaterally.
The precedent set in Kosovo on exhaustion is clear and convincing

- a state may unilaterally intervene only when all possible diplomatic
initiatives have been pursued and the UN Security Council is unable to
act. 169 Future intervenors must ensure that they can establish an equally
solid track record of diplomatic effort and UN deadlock.
many, according to this article, including "Russia's decline as a world power and its
determination to prove that it is still a force to be reckoned with by vetoing, or threatening to
veto, many American-backed proposals in the Security Council." l Others blame the US,
claiming that Washington "uses the Council 'selectively,' to find multilateral cover for its
policies, relying on regional organizations instead to legitimize force when a Russian or
Chinese veto seems likely." Id.
164 See id.
165 German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer has proposed a novel way of avoiding
Security Council deadlock by requiring that any veto be explained by the state who uses it.
See Crossette, supra note 162.
166 Belgrade's long-standing status as a client of Russia dates back to the original
Ottoman occupation of Byzantine Europe, when Orthodox Serbs turned to Moscow for
religious and cultural leadership. The continuing relationship between Yugoslavia and
Russia has prompted fears of a future Russian-Yugoslav military action to retake Kosovo.
Gennady-Sysoyev, Milosevic Wants to Get Kosovo Back With Russia's Help, KOMMERSANTDAILY, Sept. 10, 1999, at 4. Thus far, Russia has carefully avoided any official statement on
the potential for such a venture, and confines its remarks to expressions of disapproval over
the current situation in Kosovo. Id.
167 See Crossette, supra note 162.
168

The UN had explicitly endorsed NATO's role in attempting to defuse the crisis, which

may have led NATO to believe it had authority to intervene militarily when diplomacy
failed. See Miller, supra note 163.
169 David Scheffer proposes a procedure for determining when to act in the face of
deadlock, by analogizing 'intervention' to a self-defense action.
In the law of self-defense, there is the right of immediate unilateral or
collective action until the Security Council activates the collective
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D. Desire of the Victims for InternationalRelief
Both the Kosovar leadership and the ethnic Albanian people
welcomed the NATO intervention in Kosovo. 170 On January 2, 1999,
moderate Albanian political leader Ibrahim Rugova called for direct NATO
intervention to secure the peace. 17 1 In his New Years message, Rugova
stated "[w]e are convinced that the [international] verification mission and
permanent NATO attention can calm down tensions [in Kosovo].' 72 He
went on to ask for NATO action, claiming that "only the deployment of
NATO troops in Kosovo can bring about greater security for all the people
- a precondition for the political settlement of the Kosovo problem." 173
There was also wider evidence of a majority opinion among the oppressed
populace. When NATO forces finally occupied the region on June 12,
1999, enthusiastic and hopeful crowds waving banners welcomed the troops
to Kosovo.1 74
These overt signs of a desire by the ethnic Albanians for
international relief must be coupled with Professor Teson's requirement of
victims willing to revolt against their oppressor.1 75 Given the active efforts
of the KLA to fight a guerrilla war against the Yugoslav Army, the Kosovar
will to revolt was not in doubt. Clearly, the NATO intervention in Kosovo
met the requirement that the victims of the human rights abuses welcome
the intervention.

security system .... But with respect to humanitarian intervention, an
inverted procedure might be more appropriate: first, await action, if any,
by the Security Council, and when no such action occurs, a right to
intervene for humanitarian purposes without Council approval might
arise ....
Scheffer, supra note 9, at 290-91.
170 See Strike Against Yugoslavia: NATO Begins Airstrikes Against Yugoslavia (CNN
television broadcast, Mar. 24, 1999, transcript #99032402V00) (stating that the ethnic
Albanians feel intervention was long overdue and welcome the NATO action).
171See Ismet Hajdari, Ethnic Albanian Leader Calls for NATO Troops to Bring Peace,
BIRMINGHAM POST, Jan. 2, 1999, at 8A.
172 Id. (second alteration in original).
173 id.
174See John Kifner, Kosovars Venture Out, Finally, to Welcome NATO Troops, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 1999, at 31.
175

See TESON, supra note 25 at 126.
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E. Limited Force
1. Limited Objective

The NATO operation provides an interesting problem in limited
force. First of all, its objective at the outset was clearly limited. NATO
stated its goals in intervening as achieving
a verifiable end to all Serb military actions and the
immediate end of violence and repression; the withdrawal
of all [Serb] military police and paramilitary forces; the
stationing in Kosovo of an international military force; the
unconditional and safe return of refugees ...; unhindered
access for the humanitarian relief organizations; and...
the credible assurance of a willingness to work towards a
based on the Rambouillet
political framework
176
Agreement.
The language clearly avoids any mention of a surrender of sovereignty by
Yugoslavia over Kosovo. The US expressly stated at the time of
intervention that it did not support Kosovar independence, and had no
intention of forcing Belgrade to allow Kosovo's secession.
A problem arises when the victims of human rights violations
demand independence after they are rescued by intervention. NATO
confronts this problem now in Kosovo. 177 If the Kosovars succeed in
gaining independence or a transfer of territory to Albania proper, will the
NATO intervention become illegitimate? Since sovereignty remains an
important norm of international law, a military action that leads to the
may violate that norm, in direct
territorial breakup of Yugoslavia
78
contravention of article 2(4).1
There are several possible solutions to this problem. First of all,
NATO's original intention was proper, in that the intervention had as its
primary objective a resolution to the refugee crisis. 179 To some degree, the
176

See NATO pressconference, supra note 3.

174 The KLA's original insistence on independence for Kosovo has been moderated, but
only slightly. Hashim Thaci, Kosovo Albanian leader of the Party for the Democratic
Progress of Kosovo, continues to assert that "an independent Kosovo must now be achieved
through political means." Kosovo press news agency, Party of Leader of Former Rebel
Army Outlines its Future Strategy, BRMSH BROADCASTING CORP. (summary of world
broadcasts), Jan. 6, 2000, available in LEXIS, News Group File.
178 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4), reprinted in BAsIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,

supra note 13.
179 See generally The Crisis In Kosovo: ABC Special Report (ABC television broadcast,

Mar. 24, 1999) (address by President Clinton to the nation) ("[T]o protect thousands of
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political outcome of the Kosovo problem is a thing separate and distinct
from the humanitarian crisis. NATO did not continue to prosecute the air
war once the cease-fire was signed and NATO forces occupied the
province. Had NATO invaded the rest of Yugoslavia and sought to
overthrow the Belgrade government, then NATO's motives would be
seriously called into question. As it is, any eventual independence for
Kosovo is a separate matter. The cease-fire signed by Milosevic requires a
return to the semi-autonomy Kosovo enjoyed before he took power, but
Kosovo remains within the sovereignty of Yugoslavia. 180
There is some precedent to this argument, particularly in the Indian
intervention into East Pakistan in 1972.181 India intervened to stop
rampaging Pakistani military forces from the slaughter of thousands of East
Pakistanis.18 2 By the time the conflict had ended, East Pakistan had
seceded and a new state, Bangladesh, was born.18 3 India and Pakistan were
sworn enemies, and it certainly advantaged India to see its rival divided.
However, India defended its action on the grounds that intervention was
required to prevent a human rights tragedy, and argued that what happened
afterwards was a separate event. 184 According to this argument, so long as
the original intent of the intervenor is limited to preventing or ending a
crisis, then the breakup1 85of the state is a secondary effect and does not
illegitimatize the action.
A second solution is to invoke the principle of self-determinationas
superior to sovereignty. Under this model, an intervention will be
innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting military offensive.., to prevent a wider war, to
defuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this century
with catastrophic results.") This statement acknowledges NATO's own security interest in
defusing this threat on its borders, but maintains the primarymotive as saving lives.
180 See Grant, supra note 1, at 37.
181See Benjamin, supra note 60.
182

See id. at 133.

183

Id.

' For India's argument before the Security Council, see 26 U.N. SCOR, 160 6 'h mtg. at
15, 16, 18, U.N. Doc. S/P.V.1606 (1971), cited in STEINER ETAL., supranote 33, at 1055-56.
185 David Scheffer endorses this view.

In some cases, the humanitarian imperative may indeed bring the
downfall or rout of a genocidal or repressive government. Despite their
diplomats' pro forma objections invoking legal principles of nonintervention, the world community quickly accepted the creation of a
new state and government in Bangladesh following the Indian
intervention of 1972, the fall of the repressive government of Idi Amin
after Tanzania's intervention in Uganda in 1979, and the rout of Pol
Pot's Khmer Rouge government during Vietnam's invasion of
Cambodia in late 1978.
Scheffer, supranote 9, at 291.

2001]

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

legitimate so long as the right to self-determination (as distinguished from
sovereignty) in the target area is preserved.186 Self-determination is rapidly
being recognized as an important legal norm. The United Nations is
committed to preserving the right of any people to determine their own
form of government. 187 The protection of sovereignty in international law
is designed to preserve the right of states to act. The protection of selfdetermination is designed to preserve the right of people to act, and to
decide how they will be governed.
Ultimately, the intervention must be limited to a goal that is
consistent with humanitarian intent. This does not preclude secondary
motives - the intervenor should not be required to look with favor on any
regime that has perpetrated gross violations of human rights, and it may
well desire a political outcome that includes the secession of the victimized
group-'8 8 What is required is that the humanitarian motive be the
predominant one, 89 and that the intervention itself be limited to protection
of human rights.
The self-imposed limited goals of the NATO operation have
established a precedent for future humanitarian intervention. From the
outset, NATO declared that it would cease hostilities once the Yugoslav
army withdrew from Kosovo. NATO pointedly avoided demanding that
Yugoslavia surrender sovereignty over the region. By clearly outlining the
goals of the operation, NATO sent a clear message to other would-be
intervenors that this operation should not be used to justify military
intervention for non-legitimate means.

186

Thus, during the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda, Tanzanian President Nyerere

insisted that the overthrow of Idi Amin must only be accomplished with the support and
consent of the Ugandanpeople. The right of Ugandans to determine their own government
was seen as important enough to justify helping Ugandan rebels overthrow Amin. See
TES6N, supra note 25, at 183.
187 This commitment by the UN to the principle of self-determination is found in both the
UN Charter (articles 1(2) and 55 both include among the purposes of the UN a "respect for
the principle of equal rights and the self-determination of peoples") and in many subsequent
international covenants. See THoMAs D. MUSGRAVE, SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL
MiNorrmEs 62-77 (1997). For specific covenants recognizing the importance of selfdetermination, see, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976,
part I, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173.
188 See Benjamin, supra note 60, at 156 ("An absolute disinterestedness requirement, by
which a state must have no political, economic, or strategic motive for the intervention, is
impractical ....
The real question is whether the humanitarian motives predominate over
other self-interested, political motives.").
189 See id.
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2. Limited Duration
It remains to be seen how NATO will deal with the Albanian
secessionists and the problem of limiting the duration of its presence. Now
that Albanians have returned to the region, NATO has assumed the role of
providing relief for the refugees and assisting them in resettlement. 90 By
claiming the right to intervene, NATO has incurred a duty to remain until
the political situation stabilizes enough to warrant withdrawal without fear
that ethnic violence will once again break out. It would defy reason for an
intervenor to argue that stopping human rights abuses requires intervention,
and then to withdraw after the immediate crisis has passed and allow the
abuser to return. Now that NATO forces are on the ground and securing
the peace, they must remain until it is realistic that the crisis will not resume
after their departure. It may be that NATO will slowly turn the operation
over to the UN, which has already formally endorsed it' 9' and accepted
responsibility for civil administration and refugee relief. 192 NATO may
also decide to stay until all of the major war criminals indicted by the
Hague tribunal are in custody. Some argue that only then will Kosovo's
ethnic Albanians be truly safe.' 93 As new conflicts in the region emerge,
the role of NATO continues to evolve. 94 NATO needs to pay close
attention to the duration and objectives of its KFOR 195 mission, and avoid
turning a legitimate humanitarian intervention into something else
altogether.
F. Multilateralism
The NATO operation in Kosovo provides an example of the
advantages of multilateralism in humanitarian intervention. NATO is
neither a neighboring state, nor an ally of either warring party, but a
190 Technically, the UN has assumed the role of providing civil administration in the
province. Problems Faced by NATO Peacekeepers in Kosovo (NPR radio broadcast, Jan.
13, 2000). However, NATO was the intervenor, and the ultimate responsibility for the plight
of the Kosovars rests with NATO.
191 See S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 5 4 h Sess., 401 1 th mtg.
5, at 2, U.N. Doe.
S/RES/1244 (1999) (announcing the Security Council's decision to send civil and military
forces to the region, under the auspices of the UN).
192 See id. There are many indications that the UN and NATO are both failing in this

mission. See UN Force Fails to Prepare Kosovo Peoplefor the Winter, IRISH TIMES, Jan.
25, 2000, at 23.
193 NATO also has a duty to protect the minority Serbs, now that the Albanians have
returned. Reprisals against Serbs are an ongoing problem. See Erlanger, supranote 129.
194 NATO officials now find themselves forced to contend with other separatist groups in
the region, as well as spill-over conflicts in Macedonia and around the edges of the NATO
zone. See Matthew Kaminski, NATO Takes On the Role of Balkan Peace Broker,WALL ST.
J., Mar. 5, 2001, at A19.
195 The acronym assigned to the "Kosovo Force."
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multilateral military alliance consisting of nineteen sovereign states.
Certainly NATO did not act as an entirely disinterested party. After all,
NATO was created to ensure the security of Western Europe. However,
because of the nature of the alliance, its primary objective in the Kosovo
intervention was to prevent humanitarian tragedy, and thereby maintain the
peace and stability of Europe as a whole. The humanitarian and security
concerns of the NATO allies were intertwined and overlapping, but
preventing a humanitarian tragedy was ultimately the primary goal because
it was the most effective way to ensure security. The fact that so many
different countries participated in the planning and waging of the war in
Kosovo lent credence to NATO's claim of humanitarian intent by ensuring
that the interests of one particular state did not overcome the genuine
humanitarian impulse behind intervention.
As an added benefit, the show of political unity that came from
concerted action of so many states may actually have done more to end the
conflict than any amount of NATO bombs.
This illustrates another
reason to favor multilateralism: it isolates the violating state and creates an
added pressure to capitulate and allow the presence of peacekeepers.
Undoubtedly, the intervention was very difficult, both politically
and militarily, for NATO. After all, this sort of operation is hardly what the
defensive alliance was designed for. But the effectiveness of regional
security organizations as intervenors in humanitarian crises is clear. A
regional military alliance like NATO is far better equipped to intervene in a
hostile environment than the UN, which ordinarily must wait until the
197
warring parties agree to a cease-fire before inserting peacekeepers.
Furthermore, the involvement of a regional security organization sends a
powerful message that the international community views the humanitarian
crisis as a threat to peace and stability. Finally, the involvement of many
states helps prevent the interests of one state from overcoming the
humanitarian motive behind intervention. 98 Multilateral intervention is
thus both more effective and more legitimate than intervention by one state.
Kosovo was not a UN operation, so NATO cannot claim that the
entire international community supported it, but on the whole it sets a
strong precedent for multilateral action. Notably, the United Nations has
never condemned the NATO action as illegal, which implies a tacit
196

See Butcher & Bishop, supranote 1; see also Barry & Thomas, supranote 1.

197 Interestingly, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has himself insisted that it is
"natural" for NATO to handle Kosovo, and that the UN favors allowing "regional
organizations" to deal with such conflicts. Miller, supra note 163.
198Of course, it is sometimes impossible to completely eliminate different national

interests, even in the context of a multilateral intervention. For example, Albanians have in
recent days accused the French KFOR forces of favoring Serbs and refusing to adequately
protect Albanians. See British Troops Battle Kosovo Albanians, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 2, 2001,
at A10.
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acceptance of the right to intervene.' 99 The UN also sponsored the final
NATO-Yugoslav peace talks signed on June 10, 1999, and the NATO
forces that now occupy Yugoslavia are under the auspices of the UN.2°°
These unofficial links between NATO and the UN confirm the impression
that the UN has accepted (through lack of any significant condemnatory
response) the NATO intervention.
IV. CONCLUSION
The practice of humanitarian intervention is still fundamentally
flawed in its current form, because it is applied unevenly and it has not been
evaluated against a clear set of criteria. The ongoing crisis in the Russian
province of Chechnya highlights this problem: intervention there is highly
unlikely, because Russia is too powerful a state to oppose. 2 1 Many wonder
what the differences are between Yugoslav treatment of ethnic Albanians in
Kosovo and Russian treatment of Chechens. 20 2 As one journalist noted,
"the difference . . . is that some countries are more sovereign than
others.' 20 3 Humanitarian intervention will not even be considered unless
there is the sense by some powerful state or group of states that their
interests are threatened and that they have the military and political
capability 2°4 to intervene effectively. Until international protection of
human rights is practiced equally across the globe, the legal doctrine of
intervention alone will fall short of achieving a significant guaranty of
human rights.
However, the NATO intervention was effective in saving the lives
of hundreds of thousands of Albanian Kosovars in immediate peril of losing
their lives. More importantly, the crisis in Kosovo clearly illustrated
the
205
weakness inherent in the UN as ultimate arbiter of all conflicts. Until the

199 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. See also Law & Right: When They
Don't Fit Together,supra note 8, at 20.
200 See Simon Houston, War is Over; Surrender:Milosevic Agrees to Pull Out of Kosovo,
SCOTrISH DAILY RECORD, June 10, 1999, at 1; see also Colum Lynch, UN Seizes Chance to
Reverse a Trend, Reassert its Influence, BOSTON GLOBE, May 8, 1999, at A8.
201 See Craig R. Whitney, Hands Off: The No Man's Land in the Fightfor Human Rights,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1999, sec. 4, at 1.
202 See id.
203id.

204 Limited capability, when honestly addressed, makes the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention as currently (unevenly) practiced seem cynical in the extreme. "One Russian
diplomat asked a State Department official what was the difference between Chechnya and
Kosovo. 'You had nuclear weapons' came the answer." Where Do America's Interests
Lie?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1999, at 29.
205 "Numerous instances exist of the obvious failure of the U.N. collective security
measures to provide the international security for which they were designed. The most
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UN becomes a body capable of rapid and effective intervention to resolve
and
these crises, some legal power to intervene must be retained by states
t
isw
206tintarean
what
is
remains
that
question
The
organizations.
security
regional
Kosovo means to current and future humanitarian crises.
In September 1999, the small Indonesian province of East Timor
erupted into violence. 20 7 Indonesian-backed militia groups, opposed to the
recent vote to secede from Indonesia, launched a series of assaults on pro20
independence groups in East Timor. 08 Comparisons between East Timor
and Kosovo were quickly drawn, and many began to clamor for a similar
resolution to the crisis. 209
Before any unilateral intervention was contemplated, the UN was
able to reach consensus and peacekeepers were dispatched, though only
after the damage had been done. 210 Nonetheless, Kosovo may have played
a significant role in the UN's resolution to intervene. To those opposed to a
legal doctrine of intervention, it may signal the sense of the world
community that NATO had gone "a bridge too far" in Kosovo, and thus
serve as a re-assertion of the UN's authority. On the other hand, had
Kosovo not happened, it is an open question whether the UN would have
intervened. The crisis in Kosovo reaffirmed the singular importance of
human rights, and NATO's decision to intervene there may have
significantly influenced Indonesia's decision to allow UN peacekeepers.
Many hope that the precedent set by Kosovo will allow "mere words," and
the threat of potentialintervention, to deter current and future human rights
abuses.2 11
Humanitarian intervention will no doubt continue to be hotly
debated. 1 2 However, barring some fundamental restructuring of the United
Nations and the methods it uses to enforce human rights standards,
recent examples include the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Sudan, and Iraq." Benjamin,
supra note 60, at 140.
206 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, stopping just short of condoning unilateral action,
has recognized the fact that internecine conflict will continue to rage unchecked until the UN
finds a way to unite. See Kofi Annan's Critique,Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1999, at
A26.
207 See John Roosa, FatalThrust in Timor, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1999, at A29.
208 See id.
209 See Barbara Crossette, A Push to Intervene in East Timor is GatheringBackers at the
U.N., N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 7, 1999, at Al.
210 See Barbara Crossette, Council Ready to Transfer East Timor to U.N., N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 1999, at All.
211 Whitney, supra note 201.
This Note is intended to analyze the legality of humanitarian intervention. It is not
intended as an endorsement of intervention as sound US policy, which is problematic on
many levels. For a brief overview of several arguments against intervention as US policy,
see Where Do America's Interests Lie?, supranote 204.
212
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humanitarian intervention will stand as the last legal line of defense in the
fight to protect human rights. El3 How it will function, and how other states
react to it, will continue to develop the law of intervention as a legal
doctrine. So long as states retain the right to intervene when the elaborate
machinery of international security fails to protect the innocent,
intervention will have a place in international law.

213

"Armed intervention by the West will necessarily be rare - undertaken only when the

case for it is strong, when the risks are limited . . . , and when it can be carried out
successfully. Other, regional or UN, peacekeepers will often have to step in. And
prevention will always be a better option if it can be achieved. But the need for intervention,
and for peace-making in general, will not go away. Better to strive for a less violent world
and fail, than to stand back and watch the killing continue." Other People's Wars,
EcONOMIST, July 31, 1999, at 13, 14.

